Despite Kant's explicit statement that every murderer must suffer death, there are at least four situations to be found in Kant's work in which the killing of a human being should not lead to the death penalty: when too many murderers are involved; when a mother kills her illegitimate child; when one duellist kills the other; when one person pushes another off a plank in order to save his life. This paper discusses these situations and concentrates on the last situation -Kant's interpretation of the plank of Carneades -with an eye to what they teach us about Kant's understanding of the law. Does Kant acknowledge a legal vacuum? In order to come to a conclusion, Kant's 'solution' of the plank is compared with those suggested by other authors, such as Cicero, Pufendorf and Lon Fuller in his famous 'speluncean explorers' case.
Introduction
Within the philosophy of criminal law, Kant 2 does not have a particularly good name. He represents a theoretical position which is nowadays seldom defended, namely the understanding of criminal punishment as exclusively justified by the principle of retribution. The aim of punishing a criminal does not lie in the well-being of society, let alone in the rehabilitation of the criminal or his reintegration into society. According to Kant, punishment must always be inflicted on a person because he has committed a crime, and from this law of punishment no deviation is permitted: 'the law of punishment' is a categorical imperative (MdSR, VI, 331).
With regard not only to the question of who should be punished, but also with regard to the penalty a particular criminal should receive, Kant subscribes to the principle of retribution.
The kind and the amount of punishment should be determined by the law of retribution: like for like. Every criminal should experience what he deserves in light of his criminal act: the how of the penalty is derived from the how of the crime, even if a similarity is not always literally possible. Therefore, Kant recommends (only?) castration as the punishment for rape and pederasty and permanent expulsion from human society for bestiality (MdSR, VI, 363) . For the same reason, Kant holds the death penalty for legitimate, because there is no similarity between http://dx.doi. org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017v16n3p459 ethic@ -Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brasil, v. 16, n. 3, p. 459 -474. Dez. 2017
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life, however wretched as e.g. in life imprisonment, and death. Therefore: whoever has committed murder must die and no substitute will satisfy justice (MdSR, VI, 333) . Against this background we have to read Kant's notorious remark that even if a civil society decides to dissolve, it must first before doing so execute the last murderer remaining in prison.
Surprisingly, Kant adds here a rather odd forward looking argument: without executing this last murderer, blood guilt would cling to the members of this then former civil society (MdSR, VI, 333) . In any case, clemency instead of punishment does not figure prominently in Kant's criminal theory.
Exceptions to capital punishment
However, as we will see, there are at least four situations in which it is according to Kant permitted to let the killing of another human being go unpunished, at least in the sense that the death penalty should not be applied. The similarity between these four situations, or so I hold, resides in the fact that they transcend the realm of law. I will be relatively brief on the first three situations and concentrate on the last and most interesting one. Kant's theory of criminal law will turn out to be more complex than often assumed.
The first of these situations occurs when there are simply too many persons involved in a particular murder. In principle, Kant holds that every murderer, i.e. not only the person who committed the actual crime but also those who ordered it and the murderer's accomplices, should face the death penalty. It might however turn out in a particular case that the number of persons involved in a murder is so large that the state would be endangered by executing them all as justice would require. In such circumstances, the state is confronted with a case of necessity in which the sovereign of the state is permitted to adopt the role of judge and to pronounce another sentence than capital punishment in order to preserve the state's population (MdSR, VI, 334).
For a variety of reasons, this is remarkable. First, there is obviously Kant's apparent denial of the categorical character of the criminal law. Whereas on the one hand every murder deserves capital punishment, it should on the other hand not always be applied. Astonishing is, secondly, that this not-so-categorical imperative is trumped by a forward looking argument, i.e. the continued existence of the state, as preferable to a return to the state of nature. Apparently, for this the price of not executing all the murderers must be paid. Thirdly, it is remarkable that it resides according to Kant within the prerogative of the sovereign to assume the role of judgenot based on a (public) law but on a decree -and to grant clemency in a crime of quite some
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proportion. This seems at odds with Kant's 'official' view on clemency as a very limited right:
the sovereign is permitted to pardon only a crime which constitutes a wrong against himself, as in a crimen laesae maiestatis (MdSR, VI, 337 ). Yet, in a case with a large number of criminals the sovereign seems to have pardoning power as well. Finally, it is worth noting that Kant accepts this situation as a case of necessity, although he generally seems to be quite reluctant, as we will see, to accept 'necessity' as an exculpating or mitigating factor in assessing crime.
3
In short, under normal circumstances the death penalty must be applied to murderers, except in a situation in which the state is at risk.
The second situation in which the intentional killing of a human being does not lead to capital punishment is the case of maternal infanticide: a woman has given birth to an illegitimate child, but because of the shame that this would cause her, she decides to kill the infant. Should the woman face capital punishment? According to Kant not, on the basis of the argument that the shame the woman would experience was so powerful that it rendered the deterrent effect of criminal law ineffective (MdSR, VI, 366) . This is remarkable, firstly, because of Kant's acknowledgement (again) of the forward looking, deterrent aspect of criminal law -which he seems to deny elsewhere (MdSR, VI, 331) -which is apparently absent in this case. If only retribution mattered, the woman should be punished. It also seems quite possible to devise a system of criminal sanctions and public oversight which would 'nudge' unmarried women away from killing their new-borns.
Second, the state surely has an interest in protecting the right to life of all its inhabitants; it is therefore strange that Kant cruelly defends that the state can ignore the annihilation of this life because it was not the right way for a child to come into existence. Is it only by being born within wedlock that one obtains the entry ticket -citizenship -to the state and the protection of the law? Apparently, we find here a situation outside the law, caused by illegal sex and by shame as the fear for societal contempt (A, VII, 255), 4 which should explain why the law does not apply and why the killing of the illegitimate child does not have legal significance. infanticide, it must certainly be possible to invent a system of public oversight and sanctions in order to prevent soldiers from trying to restore their honour through a duel. History has proven that this is indeed possible.
It must be admitted that Kant's formulations on the duel and on the killing of the child contain some ambivalence: 'it still remains doubtful whether legislation is authorized to impose the death penalty'; 'it seems that people find themselves in the state of nature'. It could be that
Kant is trying to accommodate his moral views with those practices still dominant in his 'barbarous and undeveloped' (MdSR, VI, 336-337) days. However, it is equally true that Kant's ambivalent recognition of the duel as an exception to the application of capital punishment (in case of unlawful killing) and as a 'realm' that transcends positive law already contradicted the views of many of his contemporaries. Many already then held the (well-established) view that the duel is un-Christian and that the law is deficient, as Adam Smith put it, if it does not protect men from the affronts to honour that lead to duels. In other words, Kant's statement that 'legislation cannot .. wipe away the stain of suspicion of cowardice' (MdSR, VI, 336) was already rejected by some of his contemporaries and it was proven empirically wrong by the later successful outlawing of duel. It has been argued that the rise of the administrative state gave the death blow to this practice. Conversely, since an innocent person has the right to defend himself against any attack, the attacker cannot have the right to save his life at the cost of (attacking) an innocent person.
Granting persons the right to do whatever it takes to save their lives, even attacking an innocent person, would thus indeed lead to a contradiction. No person can be permitted and prohibited to attack at the same time. This leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to reconcile the (legitimate) claims of both persons to survival, in such a situation of extreme scarcity.
14 So far so good. On the basis of this first element, it seems clear that the situation of the two men and the plank does not constitute a problem: there is simply no right to attack the innocent threat. Still, Kant discusses this case as one of two cases under the heading of 'ambiguous law' (the other case being equity), i.e. cases in the wider sense of law that do not belong properly to the doctrine of law. In another sense, therefore, it must be a problematic case. This is the result of Kant's second legal consideration. Although the situation is clear in theory: a person who kills an innocent person in order to save his life commits a criminal offence
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and is guilty of murder, this person should in practice remain unpunished. Even though the plank situation is covered, so to speak, by the law prohibiting the taking of an innocent life, this law cannot be considered effective or deterrent in this situation. 15 Kant explains: the fear of an ill that is uncertain, namely capital punishment, cannot outweigh the fear of an ill that is certain, namely drowning. 16 Therefore, this deed of killing should be considered 'unpunishable', even though the person must still be considered 'culpable'.
The combination of these two legal aspects is remarkable. Kant refuses to accept the suggestion that this situation is not covered by law at all, by rigorously rejecting a right to attack (which would constitute a wrong), but this finding is undermined, so to speak, by his insistence that the criminal law cannot be considered 'in force' in this situation of supreme emergency.
This leads to the conclusion that the person is at the same time culpable and unpunishable: what is objectively criminal, is subjectively unpunishable.
Despite the fact that the plank case belongs to law in the wider sense and the other cases discussed to law in the narrow sense, the similarity of the plank case with the other three cases discussed is striking. Every murderer must face the death penalty, but if the number involved is too large and applying the appropriate punishment would endanger the state, the sovereign can make use of his pardoning powers: these murderers remain culpable but cannot be punished.
The same is true for the murderous mother and duellist: in theory they have violated criminal law by their killings but subjectively they cannot be punished: honour and shame neutralised the deterrent effect of the criminal law. Something similar is the case in the plank situation. In neither of the four cases, Kant argues in favour of impunity: the crimes are unpunishable because of the lack of the force of the law.
Of these four situations the plank, a classical problem, is by far the most interesting one, as it occurs whenever a situation of extreme scarcity puts persons in a morally symmetrical position with regard to their claim to survival. According to Kant, such situations are often falsely dealt with under the heading of 'ius necessitatis' -'necessity has no law' -presuming that the law cannot decide whose claim to life should have priority. Kant argues that even such a situation is covered by law and that the subjective impunity does not lead to objective impunity. Pushing a person of the plank constitutes an objective wrong, even if it cannot be adjudicated.
What to think of Kant's 'solution' of the plank conundrum by his combining of these two aspects? Perhaps the best way forward here is to look at other cases in which the problem of 'killing the innocent' out of a (claimed) necessity arose, especially at sea, 17 and which sometimes haunted the courts. This is indeed possible because cases that resemble the plank
situation occur less rarely than one might perhaps presume. A well-known situation in which a group of persons were trapped on a much larger but still quite insufficient plank, was the 'raft of Medusa', famously depicted in the painting of Géricault. 18 The most famous legal case, still important in our days, is R. v. Dudley and Stephens, 19 which concerned killing and cannibalism after a shipwreck. Here, the court rejected the defence of necessity against the charge of murder, because it argued that there is no absolute duty to preserve one's life. The two accused persons, Dudley and Stephens, were convicted for murder, but their convictions were soon overturned by a pardon based on the royal prerogative. The probably foreseen prospect of this pardon made it easier for the court to decide in favour of a conviction. In the reasoning of the courts that had to deal with these real or fictional cases, various arguments play a role and they are often derived from ancient sources. It is believed, as earlier noted, that Kant may have become acquainted with the plank via Cicero, who is perhaps the first to discuss the plank and attributes it to Carneades. His De Officiis, which Kant knew well, suggests a solution which only partly coincides with that of Kant. According to Cicero, it is indeed not permitted to harm another person in order to seek one's own advantage. 22 If after a shipwreck the only available plank can carry only one person and two persons would need that plank to survive, then the person whose life has less value should give up his claim in favour of the more valuable person; if their value seems equal, they shall agree on their fate by drawing lots. 23 Many centuries later, Grotius presents us with a similar solution. 24 He argues that in times of necessity the laws protecting private property lose their validity, so that in case of a fire I may demolish my neighbour's house if that is needed to safe my own house. But this privilege of necessity does not include the taking of a life. It is not permitted to push a person off his plank for the preservation of one's life. The reason for this is not difficult to understand: the institution of private property is, as Thomas Aquinas already put it, not a matter of natural law, but merely of human law, as the best way to make use of the earth which was originally given by God to mankind as a whole. In case of necessity, everything returns to the original status as
belonging to mankind. 25 This argument however cannot be extended to the life of innocent persons. 26 In general it is held that the human life and the human body to not belong to what was originally owned by mankind; if a choice has to be made between the taking of someone else's life or giving up one's own life, the latter is the morally preferred option. There is no absolute duty to preserve one's life. 27 The opposite position is perhaps most prominently defended by Pufendorf, in De officio hominis et civis. He argues that self-preservation is such a strong urge that it may even overrule all other considerations. This is both true in cases of self-defence against an unjustified attacker as well as in the case of an imminent lethal danger caused by an innocent threat. In either case, a person is permitted to do whatever is needed in order to save his life. I, a skilled swimmer, am thus allowed to shake off an unskilled swimmer who holds on to me, or to push a person off the plank with which I hope to safe my life. According to Pufendorf, it is even permitted to harm a third person who himself poses no threat to me but who stands in my way when trying to escape from a mortal danger. When this person, say a lame person, is physically unable to step aside, I would be still excused to push him aside even when thereby seriously hurting him. 28 Blackstone, the famous commentator on the English laws, holds a similar view: the one person who 'thrusts the other' from the plank because it is not able to save them both, finds himself in a situation which is similar to self-defence. Therefore his act should be considered excusable. 29 It seems that for these authors the situation of the plank resembles that of a legal vacuum and that indeed necessity has no law. Whenever a person's life is in danger and the aid of a magistrate is not at hand, he may do whatever it takes to preserve his life, says Pufendorf. It would seem that the question of whether this act of killing is justifiable or excusable does not even arise because these qualifications only arise against the background of legal norms, but these are absent. 30 We have seen that Kant seems to side with Grotius and Aquinas, not with Pufendorf and
Blackstone: there cannot be a right to kill the innocent threat and the killer is thus culpable.
However, since the criminal law is without force, the culprit cannot be punished. This makes On the other hand, Kant clearly accepts that situations occur in which the law is either too harsh and must be softened, as in the case of multiple murderers, or too inconsiderate to acknowledge the importance of passions such as honour and self-preservation. Kant acknowledges possible claims by unmarried mothers, surviving duellists and survivors from shipwrecks who argue that they had no choice but to disobey the law in order to protect their honour or to save their lives. The argument, mentioned earlier, that Kant is perhaps seeking to accommodate the demands of the categorical imperative of criminal justice with some prejudicial practices of his time, cannot be valid for the plank situation. This is a timeless issue, which is literally far removed from the realm of ordinary law as it takes place at the high sea.
This might explain why Kant discusses the first three emergency situations within the context and convicted, irrespective of the pressure to which they were exposed: lex dura sed lex. A conviction of such an 'involuntary' murderer would strongly underline the importance of the respect for the right to life of others: no one has an absolute duty to preserve his own life, certainly not when this would require the taking of an innocent life. On top of this, such a conviction could perhaps also have a deterrent effect for persons in future similar situations.
This would be the true alternative to Pufendorf's position; it would make clear that both Kant's and Pufendorf's presumption that everyone faced with an imminent death would (be permitted to) do whatever it takes to save his life, is false, both empirically -not all persons are willing to push the other off the plank in order to save their life -and morally. 
In general, the plank situation gives us much to think about, even when similar cases occasioned by maritime disasters occur less regularly nowadays than in Kant's days. The importance of the case does not depend on two persons struggling over a plank in order to survive; it can stand as a metaphor for all those situations in which a plurality of human persons are confronted with extreme scarcity. Indeed, more than two persons are often involved, as in the real example of R. v. Dudley and Stephens and in the fictitious case of the speluncean explorers. One can also think of 'trolley problems', very popular among philosophers today, or of disaster scenes where emergency services have to make immediate decisions on how to distribute most efficiently the scarce medical resources. Even problems of global justice can be understood in terms of the plank: on the basis of the right of necessity the wretched of this earth would have the right to take whatever is needed for their own and for their offspring's survival;
and those who are leading a wealthy life based on the mere fact of being born in a lucky part of this world, would simply be obliged to give up their luxury. Indeed, is there a significant moral difference between the situation of two people struggling over a plank in order to survive -a situation of extreme scarcity for both -, and that of a nation, living say on one of the Salomon islands -threatened by climate change -and seeking a new place to live but finding only territories that are already inhabited by other nations?
